STATE OF ILLINOIS  ) 
                                         ) SS
COUNTY OF L A K E   )

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE WASHINGTON IN SUPPORT OF
   AMENDED PETITION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
CONNIE Wash, being duly sworn on oath, and having personal knowledge of the relevant facts presented herein, states as follows:
   
1. That Affiant, CONNIE Wash, the Defendant in the above-entitled action, makes this Affidavit in support of the Petition to vacate the judgment entered therein on July 23, 1992, in favor of Plaintiff and against Affiant.

2.   That said judgment should not have been entered and should not be allowed to stand because I was not delinquent in my monthly payments to Plaintiff.

3.   That said judgment was entered aforesaid without any fault or negligence of Affiant.

4. That Affiant is a Section 8 Program participant.  The Waukegan Housing Authority forwards the monthly payments to the Plaintiff, on my behalf. 

5.   That further, I have a letter from the Waukegan Housing Authority stating that my rental payments were paid through August, 1992, specifically June, 1992.

6.   That I have been diligent in presenting my defense.  I was unable to attend the trial date due to illness and upon my physician’s advice. (a copy of the physician’s recommendations are hereto incorporated and attached as Exhibit D).

7.   That further, I sent in my stead, my daughter to inform the court of the matter.  The court would not accept my daughter’s request.

8.   That Affiant has on the merits, a valid defense to Plaintiff’s purported cause of action therein, in that my rental payments were current through the month of August, 1992, specifically June, 1992.

STATE OF ILLINOIS ) 
                                        )  SS
COUNTY OF l a k e     )
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that she verily believes the same to be true.

                          
                                      CONNIE Wash

See Also:  Divorce New York
                                        

 Court properly awarded the marital home to the wife, considering that she was awarded custody of the couple’s child and that she operated a day care facility, licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services, from the home, garnering necessary familial income.  Craig v. Craig
 Where petitioner wife had custody of the children, assignment of marital house to her was justified.  In re Zummo
 Where the court properly considered not only the factors outlined in this section, but also other relevant factors including petitioner wife’s contribution as a homemaker, her vocational skills and employability and custodial provisions for the minor child, the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding marital home to petitioner.  In re De Bat
 Where financial positions of parties were not equal, and wife had experienced medical problems that increased her expenses and curtailed her ability to work in the future, the trial judge properly found that wife’s low income compared to the standard of living she had experienced during the marriage made an award of maintenance appropriate, and that husband’s past behavior made the award of the marital residence to wife in lieu of periodic maintenance payments appropriate.  In re Sevon
 Award of the marital home to wife, evaluated on the circumstances of the parties, balancing husband’s superior earning capacity and retirement benefits with providing wife with the marital home, considering that wife was the custodial parent, that the children were quite small, and that she contributed to the acquisition of the marital assets with her savings and earnings when first married, and later as homemaker, was proper.  In re Murphy
 Despite the considerable amount of physical labor which the husband devoted to the construction and planning g of the home, and his use of the money which his father gave him for the acquisition of the land on which the home was located and the construction and landscaping of the home, the husband did not overcome the presumption that he did not intend to retain any portion of the amount which he contributed toward acquisition and construction of the parties’ marital home as his non-marital property; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the entire marital residence to the wife.  In re Legge
 A husband had no absolute right to a partition of the marital residence and the court did not err in awarding the wife possession of the marital home until the youngest child became emancipated, and even though this event may not have occurred for nine years, the period of possession awarded the wife was not unreasonable.  In re Woolsey
 Where the marital residence was purchase shortly after the marriage with proceeds from an account to which wife had contributed over $13,000 and husband had contributed over $8,000 and in view of the short duration of the marriage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife a share of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home which reflected the amount by which her contribut5ion to its purchase exceeded husband’s.  In re Pedersen
 Notwithstanding the fact that the marital home was owned by the parties as joint tenants, there was no abuse of discretion by the court in awarding the real estate equally to the parties without requiring husband to reimburse wife for homeowner expenses, such as real estate taxes, mortgage installments, insurance and maintenance, incurred by the wife; the disposition of the real estate was properly based upon the factors mandated in subsection (c) of this section, not on the legal form of ownership of the property.  Junge v. Junge

Divorce Las Vegas

 A father cannot be relieved of his obligation to support his minor child by agreement with the mother. Martin v. Comer.
 The financial status of a plaintiff’s wife had no bearing upon the obligation of plaintiff to support his minor child. Edwards v. Edwards.
 Former wife is not relieved of obligation to pay support for children in custody of former husband merely because she is not currently employed and has no income. Keown v. Wright.
 The fact that former wife had two young children at home, one from her current marriage, did not relieve her from the obligation to pay support for the two living with her former husband. Keown v. Wright.
 Laches is not available as a defense unless the party pleading it was prejudiced by the opposite party’s delay. Martin v. Comer.
 Although both parents should generally exercise responsibility for their children’s support, this obligation is not mandatory in all situations, and the courts will not impose support payments on the noncustodial parent regardless of the needs of the children. In re Reed.
 A father’s duty to support his child is not destroyed by a divorce decree, nor a decree granting the care and custody of his child to his wife or some other person. Martin v. Comer.
 Where the trial court determined that the husband’s obligation to pay the second mortgage on the marital home was part of an order for support rather than part of a property distribution, the obligation was not dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings. In re LaShelle.
 
 Where petitioner husband was required to pay substantial additional sums for private schooling and counseling for children, if such schooling and counseling were necessary and actually took place, no error resulted. In re Bussey.
 Considering the great disparities in incomes between the parties, child’s tuition and books, along with the cost of his college and professional education, should be paid by the father and not be included as part of the $1,000 per month child support. In re Edelstein.

See Also:  New York Divorce

Women attorneys have found a niche in the divorce and family law area.  Women are excelling in this area for several reasons.  Firstly, women attorneys have shown a desire to work in the divorce and family law specialty.  They have shown an ability to combine the necessary attorney skills with the perspective and understanding to deal with clients.
Secondly, female divorce clients have shown a strong desire to have a female divorce attorney.  This combination has created a niche industry for female divorce attorneys.  Personally, I feel that women attorneys have risen to the occasion in this area of law.  There is no necessity for a person to hire a male attorney.  Women have demonstrated the ability to be excellent attorneys.  It simply takes a balance of legal skill and compassion for the client.  When an attorney is proficient in these two areas, she will excel in and out of the courtroom.  Client satisfaction is the greatest reason for referrals.  When an attorney can please the client with positive results, the referrals will follow.

See Also:  Divorce New York

 Where it was clear that the trial court took into consideration the transportation costs the husband would incur and the cost of term life insurance the husband was ordered to acquire, and credited the husband with an amount equal to four weeks” support to compensate for the time the husband would exercise visitation, the court did not agree that the trial court’s award of child support was contrary to the facts or the law, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment ordering the husband to pay $3,300 per month child support based on an average net monthly income of approximately $9,800. In re Osborn.
 Where support payments per month constituted less than one-seventh of petitioner husband’s net income, there was no breach of discretion in the trial court’s determination. In re Bussey.
 An award of $250 monthly was not unreasonable support for a 15 month old child, considering that support awards may be changed from time to time as circumstances dictate. In re Spomer.
 Child support award to former wife was adequate, based upon her relatively good income, the upcoming ability of the twins to commence part-time work, former husband’s needs for his second family, and the fact that the present award takes over 21% of his income. In re Runge.
 Based on the financial position of the parties and the needs of their two minor children, the evidence held sufficient to award child support in the amount of $50 weekly for each child. In re Clearman.
 Court’s award of child support in the amount of $100 per month per child was not excessive. In re Coram.
 Child support award was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Sipich.
 An award of $300 per month was adequate considering the income of the appellee, the maintenance and property award to the appellant, and the fact that the appellee would have custody of the child for three months of that year. In re Preston.

See Also: Divorce New York

 A reasonable basis for setting a figure below the guidelines existed where both parties had more than enough income to provide for a child, and an award of 20% of the noncustodial parent’s income exceeded the bounds of anything the child could reasonable need or desire. In re Bush.
 A large income does not necessarily trigger an extravagant lifestyle or the accumulation of a trust fund. In re Bush.
 Where the incomes for both the mother and father are far above average, there is no rule of law requiring excessive child support so that the child or the custodial parent can diminish the accumulation of an estate by the noncustodial parent. In re Bush.
 The court has the leeway to set an award below the guideline figure. In re Bush.
 This Act was not intended to create windfalls but, rather, adequate support payments for the upbringing of the children. In re Bush.
 The court may deviate from the established child support guidelines, after considering all of the relevant factors set forth in subdivision (a)(2); the trial court’s award of $25-per-month child support was not abuse of discretion. In re Burris.
 Although the noncustodial parent was entitled to a credit for the dissipation of marital property and for the overpayment of child support, the trial court erred in reducing the child support award based solely on its findings that the custodial parent dissipated marital assets and that noncustodial parent overpaid child support. In re DiFatta.
 Trial court’s failure to give any reason for its downward deviation form the statutory guidelines where it specifically found parent financially able to pay child support warranted reversal. In re Charles.
 Court abuses its discretion when it deviates from the statutory child support guidelines solely because the noncustodial parent has a prior child support obligation pursuant to a court order. In re Stanely.
See Also:  Divorce Lawyers New York

   The doctrine of equitable estoppel was not applicable where it did not appear that defendant did anything that he otherwise would not have done assuming that plaintiff had agreed to a reduction; the defendant had remedies available to which he did not avail himself, and plaintiff had not by her statements or conduct led defendant into his current situation. Lewis v. Lewis.
 Where, in a suit for child support arrearages brought by wife 16 years after decree of divorce was entered, wife’s claim was estopped, where from the evidence it could have been inferred that plaintiff did not expect child support from the defendant, but instead expected that such support would come form her second husband, and her conduct over the years was consistent with this position and there could have been little doubt but that she intended defendant to rely on such circumstances believing the necessity of modifying the decree of divorce unnecessary. Martin v. Comer.
 The doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied as to all or part of past installments in an appropriate case. Johnson v. Johnson.
 The mere passage of time does not bring into effect the principle of equitable estoppel. Martin v. Comer.
 A mother was estopped from asserting any claim to support payment from her children’s father for the period of time that their daughter lived with him. Strum v. Strum.
 Nothing in subsection (a) of this section or this entire Act indicates that the legislature intended to abolish all actions in equity that existed for child support before the statute was enacted and the provisions of the Act did not preclude the court from entertaining a child custody and support action notwithstanding that the parties were divorced in England. Skilling v. Skilling.
 The trial court correctly relied on evidence outside the record when it noted that father noncustodial parent had some benefits available to him through his self-employment status as a farmer. In r Kern.

 Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying child support payments to the husband, where the trial court required the wife to pay for child’s medical insurance and clothing and all of expenses during visitation. In re Mitchell.
 An order requiring a father to pay two-thirds of minor’s support was not an abuse of discretion, where the court determined that since the father enjoyed a greater income, he should pay a greater percentage of the support. In re McMahon.
 There was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s award of maintenance of $700 to wife from husband when husband earned between $21,000 and $24,000 a year. In re Reyna.
 The trial court’s award to plaintiff of $150 a week for alimony and child support was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse of the court’s discretion. Lewanski v. Lewanski.
 Trial court did not abuse its discretion when, in addition to periodic alimony, it awarded to plaintiff all of the furniture in the marital apartment, and one-half of the coin collection, but did abuse its discretion when awarding a 1973 Pontiac automobile. Lewanski v. Lewanski.
 Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother child support payments of $165 per month where wife, in addition to supporting her son, had to maintain herself and the home, and further, she testified that even with the $150 per month support payments she was still having trouble meeting the child’s financial needs. Raski v. Raski.
 In view of the relative incomes of the parties and the amount required to provide necessaries for the children, modification of monthly child support payments from $250 to $400 was neither excessive nor an abuse in discretion. Huffman v. Huffman.
 The trial court did not abuse its discretion where it modified a divorce decree to require father to pay the educational expenses of a child, but only if the child went away to college. Imes v. Imes.

 Among the factors to be considered in determining the amount of child support are the ages of the parties, their condition of health, the property and income of the husband, any separate property and income of the wife, and the station in life of the parties. Fields v. Fields.
 Maintenance, child support, and attorney fees are directly related to a final property disposition since these awards are dependent upon the financial resources of the party, including marital property, for whom the award is made. In re White.
 The trial judge’s deviation from the statutory guidelines in establishing child support constituted error which necessitated reversal. In re Jelinek.
 The trial court abused its discretion by basing the award of child support on the assumption, unsupported by the evidence, that respondent earned more than the record indicated and by requiring respondent to pay a disproportionate portion of the children’s expenses. In re Smith.
 Where the names of the children were mentioned in the complaint but the only relief sought was a divorce, plaintiff could not be required to pay $40 per week to the clerk for the support of his minor children. Weldon v. Weldon.
 Husband’s increase in child support was proper where he admitted that his income had increased and, in fact, the record reflected a substantial increase. In re Mitter.

 The court properly considered the subsequent employment and earnings of the defendant-mother, which also was a proper consideration in determining a reasonable and proper support amount to be ordered. Edwards v. Edwards.
 An award not supported by the evidence must be set aside. In re Hilkovitch.
 Award of child support for one child was generally a minimum of 20 percent of a supporting net parent’s income and the trial court erred in awarding an amount in excess of that by miscalculating the husband’s income. Sawicki v. Sawicki.
 It was not error for the court to order support in excess of the minimum provided for in the guidelines; it was agreed upon between the parties as allowed by subdivision (a)(2) of this section, and even though it was not required to do so, the trial court did enter findings which concerned the agreement and the basis for the child support amount. In re Steichen.